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We investigated the effect of the factors Reward Type (points vs. money) and 
Reward Schedule (constant vs. variable) on bias in a computerised binary decision-
making task. Participants (19 female; N = 32) were aged 18 to 41 years were asked 
to identify which colour was in majority in a two-colour visual discrimination task 
embedded in a computer game. We measured reaction times, accuracy and 
proportion of bias congruent responses as manifestations of bias in participants’ 
decision-making. An exact binomial test indicated that participants chose the option 
providing on average larger rewards at a rate greater than chance (p < .001). 
However linear mixed modelling and model selection provided minimal evidence to 
indicate that this bias was due to either Reward Type or Reward Schedule. Bias was 
greater when participants were told a priori about the likelihood of trial occurrences 
compared to being rewarded for correct trials (p < .001). Future research may test the 
effect of different reward sizes and true vs. random scoring on bias in the current 
context. In keeping with the scientific principles of honesty and collaboration, all 
analysis scripts, raw data, preliminary study plans and final manuscript are available 













Decision outcomes are malleable and can be influenced by a range of factors 
including rewards, punishments, and prior information (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). Decisions are often made using heuristics, also known as cognitive shortcuts 
or biases, to make best use of limited time and computational power available when 
making decisions (Neth & Gigerenzer, 2015). Laypeople generally consider bias to 
be an objectively maladaptive cognitive shortcut wherein decision outcomes do not 
align with facts about reality. However, biased thoughts are often adaptive, such as 
when one option yields a greater payoff than another, or when relying on a heuristic 
instead of an exhaustive algorithm when full information is not available (Haselton, 
Nettle, & Murray, 2015).  
The use of bias as a heuristic is especially relevant given that resources such 
as time and computational power are always limited in real-world scenarios. Bias 
can be most accurately understood as a systematic pattern of thought which reduces 
cognitive load by extrapolating previous data and applying it to current situations 
(Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002). Understanding the drivers of bias in 
decision-making can inform the mechanics of cognition, contributing information to 
models of human cognition and neural function (Heekeren, Marrett, Bandettini, & 
Ungerleider, 2004).  
In the current research, we attempted to understand how bias in decision-
making would change when different rewards were provided for correct responses. 
We compared bias levels due to real vs. nominal rewards (i.e., money vs. points) and 
constant vs. variable reward schedules to investigate how the salience and utility of 
rewards would alter bias in decision-making (Zink, Pagnoni, Martin-Skurski, 
Chappelow, and Berns, 2004). We expected monetary rewards increase both salience 
and utility of rewards compared to virtual points, and we expected variable reward 




schedules to increase only reward salience as compared to constant reward 
schedules. To encourage use of cognitive biases, we limited the time and information 
available for each decision to be made. Participants were asked to indicate which 
colour was in majority in a two-colour stimulus, with one colour rewarded more 
highly than the other at a constant level, or at a usually smaller level with occasional 
larger values (“jackpots”) so the average reward was the same. Participants’ bias 
manifested when one option was consistently chosen with a higher level of accuracy, 
faster response time (RT) or a higher proportion of responses compared to the other 
available option (Vickers & Lee, 1998). We attempted to bias participants toward the 
colour with the higher potential payoff to initially test the effects of bias in decision-
making, and additionally we manipulated the type of reward and schedule of 
delivery. We compared bias levels across four distinct reward conditions each with 
varying levels of reward salience and utility.   
Initially this paper introduces theory explaining how decision outcomes can 
be altered using different incentives and schedules of reinforcement, focusing on 
which variables may alter bias most effectively. We review previous studies which 
investigated bias in two-choice decision-making and finally outline the present 
study. We then report outcomes of our experimental analyses, including the effect of 
rewards and prior information on bias. Separate analysis of cohort and individual 
means provide an indication of individual differences in bias. We focus primarily on 
testing the effect of different reward types and reward schedules on bias.  
Bias as a resource-saving pattern of cognition 
Use of heuristics is almost always the most adaptive way to make a decision, 
because although the ideal decision outcome is not guaranteed, much expenditure of 
time and computational effort is eliminated, resulting in a minimal net loss of 




resources (Simon, 1972). The concept of bounded rationality says that because 
resources such as time and computational power are always limited, decisions are 
often made through use of cognitive shortcuts. People often “satisfice” instead of 
“maximising”, meaning that they choose a “good enough” option rather than 
expending additional resources to identify the best outcome (Simon, 1972). Simon 
provides the example of a chess player with two options when considering each 
move: (1) the outcome of every possible move is calculated each time the player has 
a turn and the best option is implemented, maximising the probability of winning the 
game, or (2) a long-term strategy is applied, and players employ biases to satisfice 
and reduce the computational power required to choose which move to make. Simon 
explains that if infinite time and computational power were available, the first option 
will always yield the best outcome. However, resources are limited, so chess players 
instead examine a fraction of the available options and satisfice by choosing a move 
they consider to be “good enough” which fits with their overall strategy.  
Investigating bias in decision-making  
Ensuring that contextual factors such as rewards have a reliable and 
consistent influence on bias is key to accurate and robust research. This can be most 
easily achieved when research is conducted in a controlled experimental 
environment. It is particularly important to control extraneous variables when 
investigating bias in decision-making because decision outcomes are contextually 
bound, meaning that they change according to contextual factors such as external 
and internal influences, past experiences and prior knowledge (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). External factors that can alter bias include the presence of 
rewards or punishments, and internal factors include individual differences such as 
subjective value of rewards, personal preference, prior information and experience 




(Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example, Jonas, 
Schulz-Hardt, Frey, and Thelen (2001) found that bias changed according to the 
mode of information presentation: participants demonstrated higher levels of 
confirmation bias when prior information was presented simultaneously rather than 
sequentially.  
Controlling contextual factors while researching bias in decision-making can 
be done by using a computer program to generate stimuli and take measurements. 
This ensures consistency across participants by reducing experimenter effects and 
increases the accuracy and precision of data collection to allow high-powered 
statistical analysis of results. Computer-based testing also provides additional 
advantages of low cost, fast administration, and ease of detecting malingering 
(Zygouris & Tsolaki, 2015).  
A collection of decision outcomes from one individual can be analysed to 
yield an indicator of bias levels through use measures such as reaction time, 
accuracy, and proportion of bias congruent responses. This provides a tangible 
manifestation of the latent cognitive processes that occur while a person makes a 
decision (Mulder, Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Boekel, and Forstmann, 2012). Additional 
to these classic measures of cognitive bias, researchers have imaged brains under 
multiple bias manipulations and identified key areas throughout the frontoparietal 
region which are utilised during the decision-making process. As a result, bias in 
decision-making can be linked to specific regions of the brain (Heekeren et al., 2004; 
Mulder et al., 2012). Individual deviation from cohort norms may therefore be 
indicative specifically of frontoparietal region differences in the brain. In this way, 
understanding the factors which influence cognitive bias may help inform the future 
development of cognitive clinical assessments. Heathcote, Holloway, and Sauer 




(2019) and Mulder et al. (2012) have both studied bias in visual discrimination tasks 
in a computerised context, each with findings indicating strong avenues for future 
research. 
Heathcote et al. (2019) used a computerised colour discrimination task to 
observe the effects of expectation and rewards on bias in binary decisions (decisions 
with two options). Participants were asked to identify which colour was in majority 
in a two-colour visual stimulus which randomised regularly so that it appeared to be 
flashing. Researchers attempted to induce bias by rewarding correct responses with 
virtual in-game points in a 3:1 ratio: 300 points for correctly choosing option A, or 
100 points for correctly choosing option B. Each of option A and B were correct in 
half of these trials. Researchers hypothesised that participants would be biased 
towards option A as a result of the higher payoff. Expectation bias was manipulated 
by informing participants prior to beginning the same colour discrimination task that 
option A would be correct three times more often than option B (i.e., 75% vs. 25%). 
Researchers hypothesised that participants would be biased toward option A as a 
result of being informed of the increased incidence of correct cases. Heathcote et al. 
found that both rewards and prior information had a significant influence on bias, 
however providing proportion information prior to beginning the task had a three 
times larger effect on bias compared to rewards. Heathcote et al. also noted that there 
were large individual differences on bias scores across all conditions, with the largest 
differences occurring in the reward condition. Heathcote et al. suggested that further 
research should be undertaken in a similar setting to understand the effects of 
rewards on bias and to investigate the large individual differences observed.  
Mulder et al. (2012) also studied bias in a binary perceptual decision-making 
task using an arrow congruence task. Participants were shown an initial cue arrow 




and subsequently shown stimulus arrows, then asked to indicate whether the 
stimulus and cue arrows were pointing in the same or different directions. Mulder et 
al. compared levels of bias due to rewards and prior proportion information 
according to average accuracy and reaction times. To observe the effect of 
expectation bias due to prior information, participants were informed that option A 
would be the correct response in 80% of trials, while option B would be correct in 
20% of trials. Mulder et al. also tested the effect of rewards on bias by awarding 
participants eight points for correct responses on option A, two points for correctly 
choosing option B, and no points for incorrect responses. Each of the two options 
were correct 50% of the time when points were being awarded. Mulder et al. 
hypothesised that participants would be biased toward option A in both the reward 
and prior information conditions. Participants completed the reward and prior 
information conditions both inside and outside an MRI scanner to observe which 
location in the brain was active when these bias-inducing tasks were undertaken. 
Mulder et al. found that participants were biased toward both the most likely option 
and the option providing larger rewards, though the prior information condition had 
a larger and more consistent effect on bias than rewards.   
Mulder et al. (2012) suggested that the effect of rewards on bias may not 
have been as large as expected as a result of participants’ motivation to be correct 
rather than to collect rewards. Participants were informed prior to beginning the task 
that they would gain an additional payoff of 10 euros if they performed perfectly, 
thus placing greater emphasis on the need to be correct than to gather points. If 
participants were motivated to gain the extra remuneration, these instructions may 
have influenced overall bias in both conditions, as this additional reward may have 
interacted with the points awarded for individual correct responses.  




Research from Mulder et al. (2012) and Heathcote et al. (2019) indicate that 
rewards in a computerised context influence bias in binary decision-making. 
However, this effect has not yet been found to be consistent across participants and 
contexts. Using the foundation laid by Mulder et al. and Heathcote et al., the current 
research aims to further investigate the effects of bias due to rewards in two-choice 
perceptual discrimination tasks.  
Mechanisms which alter bias 
It is well established that rewards have a strong influence on behaviour, 
known simply as reinforcement learning (Skinner, 1958). However, in the context of 
binary perceptual decisions, research by Mulder et al. (2012) and Heathcote et al. 
(2019) indicate that virtual points have an inconsistent effect on bias in decision 
making across participants, which is also a relatively small effect in light of the 
evidence indicating rewards alter behaviour radically. Virtual points are seen to 
incentivise behaviour towards a certain outcome in many contexts including 
computerised games, board games, and team and individual sports (Claus & 
Boutilier, 1998; Ghory, 2004). Findings by Heathcote et al. and Mulder et al. may be 
explained by two key theories: (1) participants were failing to attend to their reward 
systems, and (2) participants did not perceive their rewards to have a high utility 
(Isen, Nygren, & Ashby, 1988). It is important to note that salience and utility are 
not independent of one another: when reward utility increases, attention to rewards 
also increases. For example, Zink et al. (2004) demonstrated that rewards have the 
greatest effect on behaviour when salience is accompanied by pleasurable emotions 
elicited by the reward (i.e., the effect of high subjective utility).  
Reward salience, or attention to rewards, has been shown by Libera and 
Chelazzi (2006) to be an integral part of behaviour change elicited by reinforcement. 




Salience is a broad umbrella term which encompasses many factors. In the context of 
a computerised decision-making task, salience could be altered by factors such as 
reward size, type, and delivery mechanism (Hull, Williams, & Griffiths, 2013). For 
example, reward salience is likely to increase when rewards are delivered in a 
variable ratio schedule rather than being delivered constantly (Dertwinkel-Kalty & 
Köster, 2018). Variable ratio schedules of reinforcement occur when rewards are 
delivered randomly within predetermined fixed bounds and are most commonly seen 
in the form of jackpots in gambling-like games. Providing rewards within a variable 
ratio schedule is known to produce robust learning effects, making this method a 
powerful tool to alter behaviour (Rachlin, 1990).  
Increasing subjective utility of rewards within a similar experimental setting 
to that of Mulder et al. (2012) and Heathcote et al. (2019) could be achieved by 
replacing virtual points with valid currency that participants redeem at the end of 
their session (Etzel, Cole, Zacks, Kay, & Braver, 2015; Kable & Glimcher, 2007; 
Pessiglione et al., 2007). If the perceived utility of rewards was increased, reward 
salience is also likely to increase (Zink et al., 2004). A combination of money and 
variable ratio reward schedules makes use of the same principles commonly seen in 
gambling activities and is likely to increase salience and attendance to rewards 
markedly (Ferster & Skinner, 1957; James, O’Malley, & Tunney, 2017). In the 
current research we combine the effects of increased reward salience and utility with 
the aim of producing a strong effect of bias due to rewards in decision-making.  
Measuring bias in decision-making  
Common measures of bias include accuracy, response time (RT), and bias 
congruence (the proportion of responses which align with the option that researchers 
attempted to bias them toward) (Ratcliff, Smith, & McKoon, 2015). Higher bias is 




indicated by responses made with higher accuracy, smaller RT (i.e., faster), or a 
larger proportion of bias congruent responses (Vickers & Lee, 1998). It is important 
to note that accuracy and response time are inversely related, known as the speed-
accuracy trade-off, wherein faster responses tend to be less accurate, and slower 
responses are more accurate (Wickelgren, 1977). Because of the relationship 
between RT and accuracy, many researchers opt to measure only one of these 
variables. In the present study we measured both accuracy and RT and analysed 
them independently to gain a rigorous understanding of the effect of rewards on bias 
according to multiple dependent measures. However, interpretation of overall results 
patterns must be made with the knowledge of this inverse relationship between RT 
and accuracy.  
The present research 
We investigated the effect of rewards on bias in a two-choice perceptual 
discrimination task in a computerised context. We extended on research by 
Heathcote et al. (2019) and Mulder et al. (2012) by manipulating both the type and 
delivery schedule of rewards to examine the effect of increased reward salience and 
utility on bias in decision-making.  
Although punishment (i.e., the addition of something negative, or the 
removal of something positive) has been shown to influence bias, we opted to omit a 
punishment condition from the current research for simplicity. We later discuss the 
potential effect of punishment on bias in the discussion section of this paper.   
For design simplicity, we analytically controlled for individual differences in 
bias and measured and reported outcomes, rather than conducting inferential 
analyses to draw causal conclusions. Though increasing reward salience and utility 
may produce a more uniform effect of bias in decision-making, the primary aim of 




the current research was to understand the effect of rewards on bias, rather than to 
understand the cause of individual differences in bias. Therefore, we limited our 
analysis of individual differences to provide only a basis for future research by 
graphing and analysing individual participants’ means as well as cohort averages, as 
done previously by Heathcote et al. (2019).  
Each participant was assigned either orange or blue as their “bias-for” colour. 
We attempted to bias participants toward choosing this colour more frequently, with 
greater accuracy, or more quickly than their “bias-against” colour. To achieve this, 
we provided larger rewards, either at a constant level or with irregular jackpots for 
correct responses to stimuli with the bias-for colour in majority. Correct responses 
on the other colour (i.e., bias-against colour) still received rewards, though their 
expected value was smaller.  
Stimuli and responses were binary, meaning that each had only two possible 
outcomes: bias congruent or bias incongruent. Bias congruent stimuli are defined as 
those with a participant’s bias-for colour in majority (i.e., the colour that provided 
larger rewards), and vice versa for bias incongruent stimuli. Bias congruent 
responses occurred when participants chose to their bias-for colour as a decision 
response, regardless of whether they were correct. Similarly, bias incongruent 
responses occurred when participants responded with their bias-against colour, 
regardless of whether they were correct.   
All participants completed five conditions: four reward conditions and a prior 
information condition. The four reward conditions were constructed from a 2 
(Reward Schedule: constant, variable (i.e., jackpots)) x 2 (Reward Type: money, 
virtual points) design, to yield: (a) jackpot money; (b) jackpot points; (c) constant 
money; and (d) constant points.  




The jackpot conditions (a and b) delivered rewards in a variable ratio 
schedule of reinforcement for correct bias congruent responses. Participants gained 
100 points or tokens for every correct response and had the opportunity to gain an 
extra 1000 points or tokens (total 1100) every fifth time a bias congruent stimulus 
was presented (on average every tenth trial, as bias congruent and bias incongruent 
trials occurred half of the time each). The constant conditions (c and d) delivered 300 
points or tokens for correct responses to bias congruent stimuli, and 100 points or 
tokens for correct responses to bias incongruent stimuli. Bias congruent and bias 
incongruent stimuli occurred equally often in the four reward conditions (i.e., 50% 
bias congruent stimuli and 50% bias incongruent stimuli) in order to observe bias as 
a manifestation of reward rate and reward type, independent of the frequency of bias 
congruent or bias incongruent stimuli.  
Monetary rewards and virtual points were awarded in the same quantities but 
were represented on-screen as a money bag symbol and a swirl symbol, respectively. 
At the conclusion of participation, money was sent as a gift card with value 
according to participants’ final cumulative score for trials offering monetary 
rewards.  
The prior information condition was used as a benchmark against which to 
compare the four reward conditions and assess their success. Previous studies 
investigating bias in decision-making found that providing a priori information on 
the likelihood of each option being correct produces large, significant changes in 
bias, while the reward conditions produced more varied results (Heathcote et al., 
2019; Mulder et al., 2012). Before beginning the prior information condition, 
participants were told that 75% of trials would have bias congruent stimuli and 25% 
of trials would have bias incongruent stimuli. Participants did not receive points or 




money for trials in the prior information condition, but instead were given feedback 
as to whether they were right or wrong.  
The extent of participants’ bias was measured by three outcome variables: (a) 
response time (RT), the time from stimulus onset to participant response; (b) 
accuracy, the proportion of correct trials; (c) bias congruence, the proportion of bias 
congruent responses out of all responses. Higher levels of bias were indicated by 
faster response times, higher accuracy, and more bias congruent responses.  
Hypotheses  
Hypothesis 1: Given previous literature indicating a strong effect of money 
on behaviour (Etzel et al., 2015; Pessiglione et al., 2007), we hypothesised that 
participants would respond with greater bias (i.e., higher accuracy, faster RT, and 
more bias congruent responses) for all bias congruent stimuli in the two conditions 
rewarded with money compared to the two conditions rewarded with points, 
regardless of reward schedule.  
Hypothesis 2: Previous studies have shown the strong effect of variable ratio 
schedules of reinforcement on behaviour change (Skinner, 1958). As a result, we 
hypothesised that participants would respond with greater bias for all bias congruent 
stimuli in the two jackpotting conditions compared to the two constant conditions, 
regardless of reward type.  
Hypothesis 3: Based on previous literature addressing rewards and schedules 
of reinforcement (James, O’Malley, & Tunney, 2017), we hypothesised that 
participants would responds with greatest bias for all bias congruent stimuli in the 
reward condition called jackpot money, compared to the other three reward 
conditions (jackpot points, constant money, constant points).   




Hypothesis 4: Studies have indicated a consistent effect of prior information 
on bias, and a smaller, variable effect of rewards on bias (Mulder et al., 2012; 
Heathcote et al., 2019). As a result, we hypothesised that participants would respond 
with greater bias for all bias congruent stimuli in the prior information condition 
compared to the four reward conditions.  
Method 
Design   
The current study used a 2 (Reward Type: points or money) x 2 (Reward 
Schedule: constant or variable) fully within-subjects design where each participant 
saw an equal number of majority-blue and majority-orange stimuli. There was an 
additional within-subjects condition that manipulated the proportion of occurrences 
of each stimulus, but these trials were not rewarded. This prior information condition 
is known to be effective in producing bias effects and was used as a comparison to 
evaluate the magnitude of bias effects in the reward condition.  
Counterbalancing was undertaken to reduce carryover effects. The following 
five variables were counterbalanced, resulting in 32 unique sequences of 
experimental conditions (Appendix E): Reward Schedule between each session 
(constant or variable), Reward Type within each session (points or money), 
condition (reward or prior information), bias-for colour (blue or orange) and bias-for 
colour response key (z or / keys). Reward schedule was split by session to reduce 
participant confusion, so that participants completed only trials with a variable ratio 
or a constant reward schedule on any one day. Participants were randomly allocated 
to the 32 counterbalance groups. All participants completed 280 test trials in each of 
the five conditions (constant points, constant money, jackpot points, jackpot money, 
and prior information).  





We recruited 35 participants who each completed all five experimental 
conditions. After data screening (see Results section for details), data from 32 
participants was included in the final dataset, totaling one full counterbalance. Of the 
data used for analysis, participants were aged between 18 and 41 (M = 24.66, SD = 
6.18), of which 19 were female and 13 were male. Participants were recruited 
through the online University of Tasmania psychology research participation system 
(SONA) and through flyers placed around the Sandy Bay campus of the University 
of Tasmania.  
After completing both gameplay sessions, each participant’s total number of 
accumulated tokens out of the number of obtainable tokens was calculated. 
Participants were provided a corresponding proportion of $15 AUD as a reward for 
performance in the two monetary reward conditions (jackpot money and constant 
money). Reward money was provided in the form of a Coles-Myer group gift card 
sent via email. All participants received at least $10 AUD but were not informed this 
until after competition of both gameplay sessions, though only one participant did 
not surpass this threshold through their own efforts. First year undergraduate 
psychology students (n = 23) received two hours of research course credit additional 
to their gift voucher.  
The present research was approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human 
Research Ethics Committee at the University of Tasmania on May 17, 2019 
(Appendix A). The ethics approval reference number for this research is H0018111.  
Stimuli 
Participants were presented with a grid of blue and orange coloured squares 
and were asked to indicate which colour was in majority. For all trials, the grid was 




filled with 52% of one colour (correct response) and 48% of the other (incorrect 
response). To prevent participants from counting, the position of each square 
randomly updated 20 times per second, resulting in a stimulus that appeared to be 
scrambling and flashing.  
The stimuli were imbedded in a computerised game called Ari’s Staff, as 
shown in Figure 1. This game was developed by Matthew Gretton at the Tasmanian 
Cognition Laboratory, University of Tasmania. Participants were told that in order to 
break down the door and progress to the next level, Ari needed to cast the correct 
coloured spell (the colour in majority in the stimulus) at the door.  
Ari’s Staff was developed through the Unity game engine (version 
2018.3.8f1). Participants played Ari’s Staff on PCs running Windows 10 with 24” 
monitors, 1920x1080 resolution and a capacity for 60 frames per second. The 
coloured grid stimulus was approximately 52x57 squares, which corresponded to 
approximately 130x142mm on the computer monitor.  
 
Figure 1.  Screenshot of Ari’s Staff.  
 





Participants were asked to read the Participant Information Sheet (Appendix 
B) which details risks and potential outcomes of the current study. Participants were 
asked to give written informed consent to participate by signing the Participant 
Consent Form (Appendix C), which included consent for deidentified data to be 
published on the Open Science Framework for review and potential further use by 
other researchers.  
Participants played Ari’s Staff on separate PCs in a room of no more than 
four total participants at the Tasmanian Cognition Laboratory at the Sandy Bay 
campus of the University of Tasmania. Participants played Ari’s Staff for two one-
hour sessions on different days no more than 14 days apart. Neutral-coloured screens 
were placed either side of participants’ computer cubicles to reduce the effects of 
distraction.    
Participants were provided with a colour-printed copy of the General 
Instruction Sheet (Appendix D) to refer to while playing Ari’s Staff. Participants 
were also prompted by on-screen instructions detailing how to play (Appendix F) 
with specific directives separating money vs. virtual points as rewards, and constant 
vs. variable reward schedules.  
Regardless of participant success rate, each block of trials ended when 
participants had completed 140 test trials of three seconds each (two seconds from 
the onset of the stimulus to the participant’s response, and one second for immediate 
on-screen feedback). Each block of 140 trials was completed in approximately seven 
minutes. Each block ended with an on-screen prompt for participants to take a break, 
alongside instructions for the next block of trials and an option to continue when 
ready. Participants completed five blocks per session and chose the length of breaks 




between blocks, proceeding to the next block when they were ready. Participants 
completed 20 practice trials immediately before test trials of each constant, 
jackpotting and prior information conditions (but we did not provide practice trials 
when blocks changed from money to points). Each participant completed 280 test 
trials for each of the five conditions, making a total of 8,960 test trials for each of the 
five experimental conditions (four reward conditions and one prior proportion 
information condition).  
Manipulations 
Reward conditions. In the four reward conditions, stimuli had more blue 
squares in 50% of trials and more orange squares in the other 50%. Participants were 
informed of this equal distribution prior to beginning the task. After being presented 
with the stimulus and selecting which colour they believed to be in majority, 
participants were provided with immediate feedback as to whether the colour chosen 
was truly in majority (correct) or not (incorrect). This feedback included the number 
of points or tokens received, which were displayed immediately after participants’ 
colour choice was made. Participants’ accumulating total points or tokens for each 
block were displayed in the top righthand corner of the computer screen. The 
expected value in all reward conditions was 300 points or tokens for bias-for trials 
and 100 points or tokens for bias-against trials. Participants were allocated zero 
points or tokens for incorrect responses.  
In the constant points and constant money conditions, rewards were in a 3:1 
ratio, such that when participants correctly chose the bias-for colour they were 
rewarded with 300 points or tokens, and correct responses on the bias-against colour 
were rewarded with 100 points or tokens. In the jackpot points and jackpot money 




conditions, baseline rewards were in a 1:1 ratio, such that correct responses of either 
colour were rewarded with 100 points or tokens.  
Jackpotting occurred in 20% of trials with the bias-for colour in majority 
yielding an opportunity to gain an additional 1000 tokens or points if the correct 
colour was chosen (total reward of 1100 tokens or points for a correct response when 
a jackpot opportunity was present). Participants were not informed of the presence of 
a jackpot opportunity unless they responded correctly when one was presented. That 
is, they were not told beforehand that the extra 1000 points or tokens were available, 
and nor were they told afterwards that they had missed the extra rewards if they 
responded incorrectly. When correct responses were made to a stimulus presenting a 
jackpot opportunity, participants were given immediate feedback with the additional 
1000 points or tokens awarded.  
Prior information condition. The prior proportion information condition 
was fundamentally different from the reward conditions in that 75% of trials 
displayed a stimulus with the bias-for colour in majority, and 25% of trials displayed 
a stimulus with the bias-against colour in majority. Participants were informed of 
these statistics before they began. No points or tokens were awarded in the prior 
information condition, however feedback (“correct” or “incorrect”) was presented 
on-screen immediately after a response was chosen.  
Results 
Data screening  
All practice trials and anticipatory responses (RT < .25s) were excluded from 
the dataset (Jain, Bansal, Kumar, & Singh, 2015). All participants had less than 7% 
anticipatory responses (M = 0.36%, SD = 1.22%), and a maximum of 4% non-
responses (M = 0.51%, SD = 0.68%).  




Three participants’ data were excluded: two duplicate counterbalance 
sequences (one due to an experimenter’s error and the other a participant dropped 
out and re-engaged after their counterbalance sequence had been replaced) and one 
participant had RTs truncated toward the two-second time cut-off. Including extra 
counterbalance sequences in the final dataset for some sequences and not others 
contradicts the initial motivation for counterbalancing, thus they were excluded. The 
dataset with truncated RTs was re-collected from a newly recruited participant.  
Analysis 
We used generalised linear mixed effects models (GLMMs) and linear mixed 
effects models (LMEs) to analyse our data. All analyses were completed in the 2019 
version of the open-source statistical software R using the lme4 package to initially 
compute GLMMs and LME models (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015), and 
corresponding ANOVAs or t-tests were calculated using the car package (Fox & 
Weisberg, 2019). We analysed the factor “participants” as a random variable, which 
allowed intercepts to be random rather than fixed, thus including the variation 
between participants in the analysis, rather than wrongly assuming that all 
participants responded uniformly (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008). 
GLMMs were used to analyse accuracy (proportion of correct responses) and 
bias congruence (proportion of bias congruent responses) using a binomial error 
model with the probit link function. The binomial error model was used to account 
for the binomial distribution due to binary response outcomes (e.g., orange or blue), 
with the probit link function to convert probabilities of response outcomes to a 
continuous scale for analysis. See Parzen et al. (2011) and Caffo and Griswold 
(2006) for reviews of this method.  




LME models were used to analyse the logarithm of response time (RT; the 
time from stimulus display to participant response measured in seconds). We 
transformed RT data from a positively skewed distribution with skewness of 1.36 
and kurtosis of 2.23 to a more normal distribution with skewness of 0.49 and 
kurtosis of 0.27 by applying a logarithmic transformation to all datapoints. Means 
were calculated after applying the logarithm transformation so that they 
corresponded to the inferential analysis. Later we transformed means back to the 
natural scale to aid interpretation.  
Appropriate effect size calculation for mixed effects models (i.e., GLMMs 
and LME models) continue to be debated among academics and mathematicians, as 
multi-level models have multiple levels of variance which could be used to calculate 
an effect size (Jaeger, Edwards, Das, & Sen, 2017). Instead of reporting a classic 
inferential effect size, we report proportions for both accuracy and proportion of bias 
congruent responses, and seconds for reaction time. This allows simple and 
comprehensible illustrations of the magnitude of an effect (Pek & Flora, 2018).  
Accuracy and reaction time were analysed according to four predictor 
variables: stimulus congruence (true or false; within subjects), bias-for colour 
(orange or blue; between subjects), Reward Schedule (variable or constant; within 
subjects) and Reward Type (money or points; within subjects). Bias congruence was 
analysed according to the same four predictor variables but excluding stimulus 
congruence, as this analysis is confounded with accuracy.  
We define a bias congruent response as any occasion when participants chose 
their bias-for colour (the colour which provided on average higher rewards for 
correct responses), regardless of whether their response was correct. Similarly, bias 
incongruent responses are defined as occasions where participants chose their bias-




against colour, regardless of whether their response was correct. Bias congruent 
stimuli are defined as those which have the majority colour the same as the 
participant’s overall bias-for colour.  
In the analyses following, participants are considered biased towards one 
option over the other when responses are on average faster, more accurate, or have a 
higher proportion of bias congruent responses. When interpreting model outputs 
according to accuracy and RT, the key factor to interpret is the interaction between 
stimulus congruence (S) and the other three manipulated factors: Reward Type (MP; 
money vs. points), Reward Schedule (CV; constant vs. variable), and overall bias-for 
colour (C). Comparing responses to bias congruent stimuli vs. bias incongruent 
stimuli reveals the difference in participants’ bias between opportunities to gain a 
larger reward (300 vs. 100) or jackpot opportunity (1100 vs. 100). As per 
Hypotheses 1 and 2, we expected participants to exhibit greater bias toward bias 
congruent stimuli than bias incongruent stimuli.  
We first outline results according to the three dependent measures (accuracy, 
RT, and probability of bias congruent responses), then explore individual differences 
across participants. Next, we examine the effect of bias-for colour on bias and finally 
compare the prior information condition to the reward conditions. Table 1 shows the 
output from a GLMM analysis of bias congruence. Table 2 shows outputs from a 
GLMM according to accuracy and an LME model according to RT. Means and 
detailed explanations of these results follow their respective tables in-text. All 








Bias according to proportion of bias congruent responses 
Table 1 
Chi-square and p-values for bias congruence (GLMM) analysis: Bias due to rewards  
 Bias congruence 
Factor(s) χ2 p 
Reward Type (MP) 0.73 .391 
Reward Schedule (CV) 2.48 .116 
Bias-for colour (C) 3.16 .075 
MP:CV 0.01 .940 
MP:C 3.45 .063 
CV:C 0.23 .635 
MP:CV:C 0.56 .440 
Note: MP = Reward Type (Money, Points). CV = Reward Schedule (Constant, 
Variable). C = Bias-for colour (orange, blue). Interactions between factors are 
indicated by a colon separating their labels. Degrees of freedom = 1 for all 
comparisons.  
We first analysed the effect of bias due to Reward Type and Reward 
Schedule according to participants’ proportion of bias congruent responses. The 
overall probability of participants selecting a bias congruent response (0.54, 95% CI 
[0.54, 0.55]) was significantly greater than chance (i.e., 0.5) according to an exact 
binomial test, p < .001. There was no significant difference in bias congruence 
according to the factors Reward Type (money vs. points), Reward Schedule 
(constant vs. variable), and bias-for colour (blue vs. orange) in a three-way ANOVA.  
Model comparison indicated that an intercept-only model (i.e., with no factor 
effects) was more appropriate than the three-way ANOVA, by measures of AIC 
(48897 vs. 48901) and clearly by BIC (48914 vs. 48977), with a non-significant 
decrease in deviance, χ2 (7) = 10.50, p = .162.  




Overall, this pattern of results suggests that there is an effect of bias, but that 
this effect is not modulated by either of the factors Reward Type or Reward 
Schedule as was expected (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3).  
Bias according to accuracy and reaction time 
Table 2 
Chi-square and p-values for accuracy (GLMM) and RT (LME) analyses: Bias due to 
rewards  
 Reaction Time Accuracy 
Factor(s) χ2 p χ 2  p 
MP 18.85 <.001*** 1.73  .188 
CV 60.45 <.001*** 18.08  <.001*** 
S 575.40 <.001*** 510.68  <.001*** 
C 0.12 .744 0.03  .859 
MP:S 2.05 .152 1.08  .298 
CV:S 2.88 .090 2.03  .155 
C:S 3.78 .052 54.34  <.001*** 
MP:CV 10.33 .001** 0.07  .788 
MP:C 4.14 .042* 1.57  .210 
CV:C 22.78 <.001*** 0.52  .472 
MP:CV:S 1.57  .210 0.03  .869 
MP:CV:C 1.88  .170 0.38  .537 
MP:S:C 0.63  .429 5.66  .017* 
CV:S:C 0.56 .455 0.38  .539 
MP:CV:S:C 0.34  .560 1.13  .289 
Note: MP = Reward Type (Money, Points). CV = Reward Schedule (Constant, 
Variable). S = Stimulus (bias congruent, bias incongruent). C = Bias-for colour 
(orange, blue). Interactions between factors are indicated by a colon separating their 
labels. Degrees of freedom = 1 for all comparisons. Significance codes:  p < .001 
***; p < .01 **; p < .05 *. 




When Reward Type and Reward Schedule were analysed according to 
accuracy and RT (indicated in Table 2 by MP:S, CV:S, and MP:CV:S), we expected 
participants to respond with significantly faster RTs and higher accuracy when 
presented with bias congruent stimuli compared to bias incongruent stimuli. We also 
expected to see higher levels of bias when participants were rewarded with money 
compared to points, and when rewarded in a jackpotting schedule compared to 
constantly (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3).  
Accuracy. We found a small effect of Reward Type on accuracy such that 
participants were more accurate on constant trials (84.2%) than jackpot trials 
(82.5%) and a much stronger effect with significantly greater accuracy for stimuli 
favoured by bias (87.8%) than not (78.9%), both with p < .001. This stimulus 
congruence effect interacted with participants bias-for colour, being larger for blue 
(11.7%) than orange (6.1%).  
There was a significant three-way interaction between bias-for colour, 
Reward Type, and Stimulus: when stimuli were blue, participants were more 
accurate for money (12.2%) than points (11.2%) whereas there was a larger and 
opposite effect for orange (4.7% vs. 7.5% for money vs. points respectively). 
However, all methods of model comparison favoured a model that did not include 
Reward Type as a predictor and included only the main effect of Reward Schedule 
but no higher-order interactions.  
When compared to a model with only bias-for colour and stimuli congruence 
as factors, the model with only the main effect of Reward Schedule and no terms 
with Reward Type was preferred by measures of AIC (30833 vs. 30816) and BIC 
(30875 vs. 30867). We also observed a significant decrease in model deviance, χ2 (1) 
= 18.12, p < .001.  




In summary, the analysis of accuracy supports an overall effect of bias, but 
not modulation of this effect by either Reward Type or Reward Schedule.  
Reaction time. When log-RT was analysed according to Reward Type, there 
was a small, significant overall increase in RT for points (0.806s) compared to 
money (0.796s). Similarly, RT changed significantly due to Reward Schedule with 
participants reacting more slowly when rewarded in a variable ratio schedule 
(0.809s) than constantly (0.793s). We observed a large, significant decrease in RTs 
when stimuli favoured by bias were presented (0.775s) compared to bias incongruent 
stimuli (0.827s). Furthermore, Reward Schedule interacted with both Reward Type 
(p < .001) and bias-for colour (p = .001).  
There were also two interactions in which participants favoured bias 
congruent stimuli over bias incongruent: there was a larger discrepancy between bias 
congruent and incongruent stimuli when bias-for colour was blue (0.056s) than 
orange (0.047s), and similarly there was a larger effect for variable (0.056s) than 
constant (0.048s).  
We compared an initial model containing all significant (p < .05) terms to 
models with the terms approaching significance (p < .09) added one at a time, and 
then together. By the measure AIC the models with stimulus congruence included 
were preferred to the simpler model (3818 vs. 3820). The measure BIC (which 
penalises models which include more factors, as these models are more likely to fit 
the data by chance) indicated that the simpler model without stimulus congruence 
interactions provided a better tradeoff between model complexity and data fit than 
the more complex model (3905 vs. 3912).  
We can see clear evidence that participants were biased according to RT, but 
little evidence that factors Reward Type and Reward Schedule were involved in this 




effect. At best, there is weak support for the bias effect on RT being a little larger 
when rewarded in a variable ratio schedule of reinforcement compared to constant 
rewards.  
Overall for the analysis of RT and accuracy, there is clear evidence in the 
probability of bias congruent responses, levels of accuracy and speed of responses 
that the bias manipulation was effective, but that Reward Type and Reward Schedule 
had little or no significant influence on bias. In most cases, model selection indicated 
that Reward Type and Reward Schedule did not contribute to the bias effect we 
observed.  
Individual differences  
The figures below depict each participant’s differences in bias levels between 
trials presenting rewards in a variable or constant schedule (Figure 2), and trials 









Figure 2. Individual bias discrepancies according to Reward Schedule for each of 32 
participants. Differences between Jackpot and Constant conditions are ordered by 
magnitude. Note: Positive bias discrepancies indicate a larger bias when rewarded 
variably rather than constantly.   
Figure 2 indicates a clear spread of bias discrepancy between participants, 
with a trend indicating higher bias when rewarded in a variable schedule compared 
to constantly according to RT and proportion of bias congruent responses, but more 
participants responding with higher accuracy for constant trials than jackpot.  





Figure 3. Individual bias discrepancies according to Reward Type for each of 32 
participants. Differences between Money and Points conditions are ordered by 
magnitude. Note: Positive bias discrepancies indicate larger bias when rewarded 
with points than money.   
Figure 3 depicts an almost uniform spread of bias discrepancies across 
participants according to Reward Type according to accuracy, however more 
participants were biased toward trials rewarding them with points over money 
according to RT and bias congruent responses.  
Colour effects  
When data was analysed according to proportion of bias congruent responses, 
the main effect of bias-for colour and the interaction between Reward Type and bias-
for colour both approached significance (p = .063 and p = .075 respectively). 
Participants were biased toward money over points when blue was their bias-for 
colour (0.5%), but a larger, opposite effect was true when orange was their bias-for 
colour (1.4%).  




There was no main effect of bias-for colour according to either RT or 
accuracy, but when split according to bias congruence of stimuli participants the 
effect of bias was stronger for blue than orange according to accuracy (11.7% vs. 
6.1%) at the significance level p < .001. Similarly, this bias-for colour interaction 
with stimulus congruence approached significance (p = .052) when analysed 
according to RT with faster responses but a smaller effect for orange (0.047s) than 
blue (0.056s).  
There was an interaction between bias-for colour and both Reward Type and 
Reward Schedule according to RT. Participants responded equally for jackpot trials 
but with a larger decrease in speed when rewarded with a constant schedule for 
orange (0.027s) than blue (0.006s). Participants were faster but experienced a smaller 
bias effect for orange (0.005s) than blue (0.014s).  
Prior information vs. rewards  
Given the negligible effect of the factors Reward Type and Reward Schedule 
on bias in the reward analysis, we analysed the bias effect of the prior information 
vs. reward conditions only according to two factors: stimulus congruence (congruent 
vs. incongruent) and condition (prior information vs. rewards). Additionally, we 
omitted bias congruence because this analysis is not valid when there is an unequal 
number of trials in each condition, as occurs in the prior information condition (i.e., 
trials are 75% majority bias-for colour and 25% majority bias-against colour, rather 
than 50% for each). We report and interpret the interaction between stimulus 
congruence and condition according to RT and accuracy to understand the difference 
in bias effects due to prior proportion vs. rewards.  
There was a larger effect of bias according to RT when participants were 
rewarded (0.053s) compared to being provided prior information (0.043s), but this 




difference was not significant, χ2 (1) = 2.4, p = .121. However, there was a clearly a 
much larger effect of bias according to accuracy for prior information (14.7%) than 
reward (8.9%), χ2 (1) = 27.1, p < .001). When bias congruent stimuli were presented, 
there was little difference in accuracy for rewards (87.8%) and prior information 
(88.5%). When bias incongruent stimuli were presented, there was a larger drop in 
participants’ accuracy for the prior information condition (73.7%) than the reward 
conditions (79.0%).  
Discussion 
The current research investigated the effects of rewards on bias in a binary 
colour- discrimination task. We attempted to induce bias in decision-making by 
providing larger rewards or a jackpot opportunity for one colour and not the other. 
Additionally, we rewarded some trials with points and others with money, 
comparing bias across these conditions.  
The initial analysis which modelled predictors according to the probability of 
a bias congruent response indicated that participants chose to respond congruently 
with their bias-for colour more often than chance, however neither of the factors 
Reward Schedule nor Reward Type contributed heavily to this effect of bias. 
Similarly, analyses of RT and accuracy provided little to no evidence that bias 
changed according to money vs. points as the type of reward, or constant vs. variable 
as the reward schedule, and this was supported by model selection. We did not find 
evidence to support any of our novel hypotheses regarding an impact of rewards on 
bias (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3). However, we found a stronger effect of bias in the 
prior information condition than the reward conditions (Hypothesis 4), providing 
further evidence in line with findings from Heathcote et al. (2019) and Mulder et al. 
(2012).  




In light of previous literature, we can see no clear reasons why our 
manipulations did not have the intended effect on bias according to RT, accuracy, or 
proportion of bias congruent responses. Despite this, we identify possible driving 
mechanisms behind our findings. Finally, we discuss limitations of the current study 
and potential avenues for further research.  
Reward Type  
We expected participants would respond with greater bias when rewarded 
with money than points (Hypothesis 1). Much literature indicates that money 
activates reward pathways in the brain (Etzel et al., 2015; Pessiglione et al., 2007) 
and that people consider money to have a high utility (Johnson et al., 2018). 
However, our analyses provide clear evidence that Reward Type did not contribute 
to the observed bias effect.  
Reward size is positively correlated with increased enjoyment and arousal, 
especially in a gaming context (Johnson et al., 2018; Lyons, 2015). Our finding that 
decision outcomes did not differ between money and points as rewards may have 
been due to the size of rewards more so than the type of reward. Rewarding 
participants with a maximum of $15 AUD across two one-hour sessions of gameplay 
may not have been large enough to elicit a difference in utility between money and 
virtual points in this context. However, this seems unlikely as monetary 
remuneration of a similar size has previously been successful in similar experimental 
designs (Grady, Dickert, Jawetz, Gensler, & Emanuel, 2005).  
Providing course credits to 23 of 32 participants additional to their monetary 
payoff may have weakened the effect of our Reward Type manipulation. Research 
by Sharp, Pelletier, and Lévesque (2006) indicates that course credits can act as a 
strong reward which motivates attention and engagement, potentially more so than 




money or virtual points. Replication of the current research to include course credits 
as part of an experimental condition will clarify the effect of different types of 
rewards on bias.   
Reward Schedule 
The use of a variable ratio schedule of reinforcement to elicit greater bias 
compared to a constant schedule was used on the premise of ample previous research 
(Skinner, 1958), but despite this, our analyses provided minimal evidence in support 
of a difference in bias between a constant vs. variable reward schedule (Hypothesis 
2).  
Variable ratio reward systems are known to induce large and robust changes 
in behaviour however these can sometimes take time to develop (Skinner, 1958). We 
limited gameplay time to one hour per day to ensure participants did not become 
fatigued, however this also restricted time available for participants to become 
familiar with reinforcement schedules. It is possible that participants did not have 
enough time to understand and learn how to best respond while being rewarded in a 
variable schedule.  
Furthermore, the frequency of jackpot occurrences may have been too low to 
elicit behaviour change in the current context. On average, jackpots occurred one in 
every ten trials, though participants were only aware of them when they responded 
correctly to stimuli. Previous research has shown that the success of variable ratio 
schedules of reinforcement is dependent on task context (Reed, 1992). Within the 
current context, jackpot reinforcements may not have occurred frequently enough to 
elicit behaviour change, though this seems doubtful in light of ample research 
indicating that reinforcements occurring every tenth, or even as infrequent as one in 
50 spins on a slot machine, are enough to see a change in behaviour (Haw, 2008).  




Fundamentally, Reward Schedule and Reward Type are dependent on one 
another: for a participant to receive a reward, an aspect of both factors must be 
employed (i.e., the presence of a reward is not enough, it must also be delivered in 
some schedule). Therefore, the effect of Reward Schedule may have been minimal 
for the same reasons that we did not observe a difference in bias according to 
Reward Type.  
Prior information vs. rewards  
We found strong evidence to indicate that the prior information condition 
produced larger effects on bias than the reward conditions, in support of Hypothesis 
4. We found a larger effect of bias according to accuracy in the prior information 
condition compared to the reward conditions, though not according to RT. This fits 
into the speed-accuracy trade-off framework which we expected to occur as a result 
the known inverse relationship between RT and accuracy in decision-making 
(Wickelgren, 1977). Our findings provide further evidence to confirm results from 
Heathcote et al. (2019) and Mulder et al. (2012) that providing a priori proportion 
information elicits a greater level of bias in decision-making than rewarding correct 
responses.  
The interaction between condition (reward vs. prior information) and 
stimulus congruence showed negligible differences in accuracy between conditions 
when stimuli were bias congruent, but a larger drop larger drop in accuracy for the 
prior proportion condition than the reward condition when stimuli were bias 
incongruent. Vickers’ (1979) accumulator model may be a useful framework through 
which to understand this observation.  
 Vickers’ (1979) accumulator model assumes that when a binary decision is 
being made, the two options each have a defined threshold of excitation required to 




be surpassed for that option to be chosen. As evidence for each option accumulates, 
the two options “race” in parallel to their individual excitation thresholds. Within 
Vickers’ accumulator model, higher bias is represented by a smaller distance 
between the start-point and threshold of excitation for one option compared to 
another. That is, less evidence in favour of that option is required because it has been 
pre-determined to be the “better” choice.  
Further analysis is required to confirm the applicability of Vickers’ (1979) 
accumulator model to our data. However, we can tentatively draw the conclusion 
that the evidence required for participants to choose the colour occurring 75% of the 
time in the prior proportion condition was lesser than evidence required to choose 
the colour with the higher payoff in the reward condition. Thus, providing a priori 
proportion information elicited greater bias in participants than rewarding correct 
responses.   
Individual differences  
As seen by both Heathcote et al. (2019) and Mulder et al. (2012), we 
identified large individual differences between participants’ bias responses. 
Participants bias levels varied by approximately 0.15s and 25% accuracy according 
to Reward Schedule, and approximately 0.10s and 10% accuracy for Reward Type. 
Multiple participants responded with greater bias for money than points, and 
multiple in the opposite direction; a similar observation was made with constant vs. 
variable schedules of reinforcement. The speed-accuracy trade-off was apparent in 
the analysis of Reward Schedule, with more participants responding with larger bias 
according to RT for the jackpot conditions, but more participants with higher 
accuracy on the constant conditions.  




The individual differences depicted in Figures 2 and 3 provide supporting 
evidence that defining “participants” as a random factor in multilevel modelling was 
appropriate. If participants were coded as a fixed factor, or not included in the 
analysis, the information shown in Figures 2 and 3 would have not been utilised in 
modelling. Instead, averages for each condition would have been taken, resulting in 
bias scores not reflective of the variation between participants. This is important 
because, as seen in Figures 2 and 3, multiple participants exhibit bias in opposite 
directions across both Reward Type and Reward Schedule according to all three 
measures of bias. These differences would have been averaged and true effects on 
bias blurred when all participants’ scores were averaged for each condition before 
analysis. Thus, our models are likely to reflect true patterns in the data as a result of 
including participants as a random factor.  
Colour effects  
We found multiple unexpected significant (or approaching p < .05) effects of 
bias-for colour on bias. The most notable and highly significant of these colour 
effects was the larger effect of bias as measured by accuracy for blue (11.7%) than 
orange (6.1%).  
We chose the colours blue and orange to comprise the stimulus because this 
ensured that the estimated 5-8% of the male population unable to discriminate 
between blue and green colour hues would still be eligible to participate (Curcio, 
Sloan, Kalina, & Hendrickson, 1990). Bias-for colour was a between-subjects 
manipulation in which half of participants were randomly allocated to blue, and half 
to orange. It is possible that with such a small cohort of participants (N = 32), these 
effects were due to a systematic error in the random allocation to bias-for colour. 
However, as colour effects emerged consistently across all measures of bias and with 




high levels of significance, it is likely that these reflect a true effect of bias-for colour 
on bias.  
Research by Guilford and Smith (1959) indicates that colour can manifest 
bias according to personal preference, colour intensity, brightness and saturation. 
Participants were found to prefer brighter and more saturated colours, with males 
rating all colours slightly higher than females. Highest colour preferences occur for 
hues in the blue and green range across cohorts, with lowest preference for yellow, 
through these effects were small. The preference for blue and green over yellow may 
correspond to our finding of participants’ greater bias when rewarded more highly 
for correct blue responses over orange. Sex differences may also predict individual 
bias differences.  
Limitations of this research  
This research received approximately $450 AUD of funding in total to 
provide participant remuneration. Providing participants with small monetary 
incentives may have limited our ability to detect an effect of Reward Type. Larger 
rewards have been shown to increase reward salience and utility, and therefore are 
more likely to induce bias in decision-making (Johnson et al., 2018).  
The manipulation Reward Type may have been weakened as a result of 
providing credits in addition to monetary remuneration for the majority of 
participants (Sharp et al., 2006). In future research, inclusion of course credits as an 
experimental manipulation will help clarify whether the presence of course credits as 
a reward interacts with other rewards such as money and points.  
Gamification of the colour discrimination task in the present research was 
done to increase participant engagement with the task, as shown in research by 
Buckley and Doyle (2016). However, the specific gamification applied in this study 




has not been directly compared to the same task in a non-gamified setting. Thus, all 
conclusions in the current research are limited by the assumption that gamification 
increases participant motivation and attention alone and does not interact with other 
factors.  
Directions for future research  
Use of random rather than true scoring in future research may encourage 
participants to use heuristics and biases more than in the current design. By 
informing participants that on some occasions blue is treated as correct even when 
orange is truly in majority, a more severe element of randomness is introduced. 
Ideally, this manipulation will encourage participants to try to gain rewards is 
through use of strategies such as heuristics and biases rather than through accuracy. 
So long as error rates are high enough (i.e., approximately 20-40% as in the current 
study) participants are unlikely to detect whether random scoring is present or not, 
thus it may be enough to only inform participants that random scoring is present. It 
may also be appropriate to replicate this research through actually employing 
random scoring, rather than just informing participants that random scoring is 
present.  
Punishment is known to influence bias in decision-making (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). For simplicity, we adopted a design in which participants were 
not punished for incorrect responses but instead received zero rewards. Regardless of 
findings from the present research, further studies investigating the effect of 
punishment on bias in decision making would be a valuable addition to the existing 
knowledge of influences on bias in visual discrimination tasks. Conducting research 
to investigate the influence of both rewards and punishments on bias in the given 




context would require careful design to ensure that the two factors remained isolated 
during testing, allowing causal attributions to be made.  
Contributions of this research  
The current research has contributed to the literature on bias in decision 
making through testing the effects of money vs. points as rewards, and constant vs. 
variable reward schedules on bias in a computerised binary colour discrimination 
task. This study provides further evidence supporting the larger effect of bias due to 
a priori proportion information compared to rewards. Distinct from previous 
research, we found that neither money vs. points nor variable vs. constant reward 
schedules elicit a difference in bias. Specifically, we found that rewarding 
participants up to $15 AUD for two hours of participation or providing jackpots 
every 10th trial at most does not alter reward salience or utility enough to elicit a 
difference in bias in the present context. Additionally, we identified a large, 
significant increase in accuracy for participants rewarded more highly for correct 
blue responses than those rewarded more highly for correct orange responses. This 
may have implications for further research using coloured visual discrimination 
tasks.  
Conclusions  
We aimed to understand the effect of increasing the utility and salience of 
rewards on bias in a two-colour discrimination task. From the current study, we can 
conclude that neither monetary incentives up to $15 AUD vs. virtual points, nor 
jackpots available on every 10th trial vs. constant rewards alter reward salience or 
utility enough to elicit a differential effect on bias in a computerised binary colour 
discrimination task. This provides a strong avenue for future research to manipulate 
and test the effect of reward size, frequency of jackpot occurrences, and the effect of 




true vs. random scoring on bias in the context of a computerised visual 
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Ari’s Staff General Instruction Sheet  
 
 











1 CP CM P  JP JM P  O L 
2 CM CP P  JM JP P  O L 
3 P CP CM  P JM JP  O L 
4 P CM CP  P JP JM  O L 
5 JP JM P  CP CM P  O L 
6 JM JP P  CM CP P  O L 
7 P JM JP  P CP CM  O L 
8 P JP JM  P CM CP  O L 
9 CP CM P  JP JM P  O R 
10 CM CP P  JM JP P  O R 
11 P CP CM  P JM JP  O R 
12 P CM CP  P JP JM  O R 
13 JP JM P  CP CM P  O R 
14 JM JP P  CM CP P  O R 
15 P JM JP  P CP CM  O R 
16 P JP JM  P CM CP  O R 
17 CP CM P  JP JM P  B L 
18 CM CP P  JM JP P  B L 
19 P CP CM  P JM JP  B L 
20 P CM CP  P JP JM  B L 
21 JP JM P  CP CM P  B L 
22 JM JP P  CM CP P  B L 
23 P JM JP  P CP CM  B L 
24 P JP JM  P CM CP  B L 
25 CP CM P  JP JM P  B R 
26 CM CP P  JM JP P  B R 
27 P CP CM  P JM JP  B R 
28 P CM CP  P JP JM  B R 
29 JP JM P  CP CM P  B R 
30 JM JP P  CM CP P  B R 
31 P JM JP  P CP CM  B R 
32 P JP JM  P CM CP  B R 
 
Notes.  CP = Constant Points (280 trials). CM = Constant Money (280 trials). JP = 
Jackpot Points (280 trials). JM = Jackpot Money (280 trials). P = Prior Information 
(140 trials). B = Blue. O = Orange. L = Left hand. R = Right hand.  





On-screen instructions during gameplay of Ari’s Staff 
General practice  
Your path through the dungeon has been blocked by a mysterious door! The door 
has a collection of orange and blue dots. 
In order to break down the door, Ari needs to cast the correct spell! 
If more of the dots are orange then press the z / ? key. If more of the dots are blue 
then press the z / ? key.  
For correct spells, Ari earns tokens. For incorrect spells, Ari doesn’t gain or lose any 
tokens.  
This is a PRACTICE TRIAL. Try to get the hang of the controls!  
 
Constant trials  
In this trial, Ari collects tokens when the correct spell is cast.  
For correct *bias for colour* spells, Ari can earn 300 tokens / points.  
For correct *bias against colour* spells, Ari can earn 100 tokens / points.  
Earn as many tokens as you can, and if you’re not sure which spell to cast, choose 
the one which will give you the most tokens / points.  
If more of the dots are orange then press the z / ? key. If more of the dots are blue 
then press the z / ? key. 
This is a PRACTICE TRIAL. The points you score here DO / DON’T COUNT 
TOWARDS YOUR FINAL SCORE.    
 
Jackpot trials  
In this trial, Ari collects tokens when the correct spell is cast.  
For correct *bias for colour* and *bias against colour* spells, Ari earns 100 tokens / 
points. For correct *bias for colour* spells, 20% of the time Ari can earn an 
additional 1000 tokens / points.  
Earn as many tokens / points as you can. If you’re not sure which spell to cast, 
choose the one which will give you the most tokens / points.  
If more of the dots are orange then press the z / ? key. If more of the dots are blue 
then press the z / ? key. 




This is a PRACTICE / TEST TRIAL. The points you gather DO / DON’T 
COUNT TOWARDS YOUR FINAL SCORE.    
 
Prior information trials  
In this trial, Ari needs to cast the correct spell to break down the door. 
75% of the time the mysterious door will have more *bias for colour* dots, and 25% 
of the time there will be more *bias against colour* dots.  
If you’re not sure which spell to cast, choose the one that occurs most often.   
If more of the dots are orange then press the z / ? key. If more of the dots are blue 
then press the z / ? key. 
This is a PRACTICE TRIAL / TEST TRIAL. Try to get the hang of the controls! / 
Good luck! 
 
 
